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Inﬂation Targeting and
Medium-Term Planning:
Some Simple Rules of Thumb
David Longworth, Deputy Governor1
• Inﬂation targeting, a stable macroeconomic
environment, and an average growth rate for
potential output that is not expected to vary much
in the next several years all help households,
businesses, and governments in their medium-
term economic and ﬁnancial planning. A number
of simple rules of thumb can be usefully employed
in this planning.
• In particular, inﬂation targeting has, on average
over a number of years, maintained most major
measures of inﬂation quite close to the 2 per cent
target midpoint.
• Inﬂation targeting and a clear ﬁscal framework
have both contributed to a more stable macro-
economic environment, in which output varies
less around its potential level.
• Potential output growth is expected to average
around 3 per cent over the next several years.
• In light of the above factors and historical
relationships, labour income, proﬁts, and
consumer spending will likely grow, on average,
by about 5 per cent over the medium term.
• Real and nominal long-term interest rates have
been more stable over the past several years, and
this stability is expected to continue. Real 30-year
yields will likely vary in a range around 3.5 or 4.0
per cent, and nominal yields will correspondingly
vary around 5.5 or 6.0 per cent.
1.  Andrew Rennison and Gillian Boden also contributed to this article.
ecent economic shocks, such as the fall in
stock market prices and the effects of the
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, have
at times created a good deal of uncertainty
about the short-run economic outlook for Canada.
There is evidence, however, that overall, the Canadian
economy has become more stable in the past decade,
despite the uncertainties caused by these events. This
increased  stability, a result of inﬂation targeting as
well as other factors, is evident in several key economic
variables, including inﬂation, inﬂation expectations,
and output (for further discussion see Debs 2001 and
Longworth 2002).
An examination of data on the average values or
growth rates of some important economic variables
and some of their ratios suggests certain relationships
that can be useful in forming expectations of medium-
term average values or growth rates. These relationships
can be used by households, businesses, and govern-
ments to plan more conﬁdently over medium-term
horizons, given the predictability of inflation provided
by the Bank of Canada’s monetary policy. In particular,
they can use some simple rules of thumb for medium-
term planning regarding inflation, growth rates for real
GDP, nominal GDP (the total output of the economy
measured in current prices), labour income, proﬁts,
and long-term interest rates. In most cases, the rules of
thumb suggested in this article are given to the nearest
percentage point. Of course, annual growth rates (or
levels, in the case of interest rates) will be more volatile
than medium-term averages.
Implications for Inﬂation
The Bank of Canada has been targeting the 12-month
percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
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since 1991. At that time, inﬂation-reduction targets
were set for the four subsequent years, with the aim of
reducing inﬂation to a target level of 2 per cent by the
end of 1995. Indeed, the Bank stated, “The purpose of
setting out formal targets is to provide a clear indication
of the downward path for inﬂation over the medium
term so that ﬁrms and individuals can take this into
account in their economic decision-making.” (1990,10–11)
Since 1995, the target midpoint for inﬂation has been
maintained at 2 per cent within a target range of 1 to 3
per cent (Chart 1).
Crawford (2001) considers the long-run predictability
of Canadian inﬂation and its beneﬁts, as well as the
steps taken by the Bank of Canada to improve this
predictabilitywhentheinﬂation-targetagreementwas
renewed in May 2001. The steps intended to increase
predictability included providing more information to
the public, using an improved measure of core inflation,
and lengthening the term of the agreement to ﬁve
years from three. The consequent reduction in the
uncertainty surrounding future inﬂation rates would
then allow households and firms to be more comfortable
in their longer-term planning, thus decreasing distor-
tions in the economy.
Although there will always be disturbances in the
economy that will cause inﬂation to deviate from the
target midpoint, inﬂation should remain within the
target range a fairly high percentage of the time for it
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Canada desires. Crawford demonstrates that, from the
end of 1995 to July 2001, the CPI year-over-year inflation
rate kept within the 1 per cent to 3 per cent band a
good deal of the time. Table 1 extends some of his data
to December 2002. It shows the frequency with which
year-over-year inﬂation rates for CPI, CPI excluding
the effects of changes in indirect taxes (CPIXT),2 and
core CPI3 fall within various ranges around the 2 per
cent target midpoint. The evidence from the table
shows that inﬂation is close to the target midpoint in
the vast majority of months. For example, core inﬂa-
tion was between 1 and 3 percent 96 per cent of the
time, and total CPI, 78 per cent of the time.
Crawford also shows that, when considering averages
of inﬂation rates, the longer the averaging period, the
narrower the range of inflation rates required to capture
a given frequency of outcomes. For example, if the
12-month rates of CPIXT inﬂation fall within plus or
minus 1 percentage point of the target midpoint
roughly three-quarters of the time, then the five-
year averages of these 12-month rates will fall within
plus or minus 0.45 percentage point of the target mid-
point about three-quarters of the time.
Although the Bank of Canada targets CPI inﬂation,
measures constructed using the ratios of broad
indexes of prices have not varied all that much. Chart 2
shows that the core price index and the GDP deﬂator,
2.   In addition to the two measures of inﬂation that constitute the Bank’s tar-
get and operational guide, we examine CPIXT because changes in indirect
taxes tend to be one-off occurrences.
3.   Throughout this article, core inﬂation refers to the CPI excluding the eight
most volatile components and the effect of changes in indirect taxes on the
remaining components.
Note: The table shows the percentage of time each 12-month measure of inﬂation fell
within the speciﬁed ranges around a target midpoint of 2 per cent.
CPI 95  78 55
CPIXT  95 71 55
Core 100 96 75
Table 1
Inﬂation Measures and Various Ranges
Dec. 1995 to Dec. 2002
Range
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both relative to the CPI, have not varied greatly over
the past two decades, especially since 1991.
Chart 3 shows annual growth rates averaged over
ﬁve-year periods for total CPI, core CPI, and the GDP
deﬂator. Because the ratios of these major aggregate
price indexes have not moved by much, all three
inflation measures stabilized at low levels, just below
two per cent, during the 1990s.4 Thus, given the Bank
4.  Chart 3 shows that the ﬁve-year average was down to 2 per cent by 1995
or 1996, depending on the measures. This is consistent with annual inﬂation

























































of Canada’s commitment to a 2 per cent target for CPI
inﬂation, 2 per cent is a reasonable rule of thumb for
the rate of inflation going forward. (Of course, sub-
aggregates, such as goods inflation or services inflation,
can and do behave very differently.)
Smooth Evolution of Potential
Output and Implications
for Real GDP Growth
Potential output may be thought of as the level of output
consistent with no change in the inﬂation rate relative
to inﬂation expectations. The combination of a contin-
ued smooth evolution of potential output and a mone-
tary policy that targets inﬂation should contribute to a
predictableproﬁleforaveragegrowthintheCanadian
economy in the coming years.
The combination of a continued
smooth evolution of potential output
and a monetary policy that targets
inﬂation should contribute to a
predictable proﬁle for average growth
in the Canadian economy in the
coming years.
Real GDP growth versus potential growth
In the last few years, the extent to which real output
ﬂuctuates around its potential level has decreased.
The establishment of clear and appropriate frame-
works for monetary and ﬁscal policies has been an
important factor inthis decline. Inparticular,a monetary
policy geared to low, stable, and predictable inﬂation
has anchored inﬂation expectations and allowed the
economy to avoid boom-bust episodes. The Bank of
Canada changes interest rates to counter demand
shocks in both directions, thus smoothing both output
and inﬂation. Moreover, a high degree of monetary
policy credibility and a horizon of 18 to 24 months to
bring inﬂation back to its target midpoint allow the
Bank to leave interest rates unchanged in response to
short-lived relative price shocks without affecting the
real economy.18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2003
Chart 4 shows the historical evolution of real GDP and
potential output. The output gap, which is the per
cent difference between real and potential GDP, is
shown in Chart 5. Since the recession of the early
1990s, the output gap has for the most part remained
between plus or minus 2 per cent; in fact, over the last
four years the gap has varied within a narrower range.
The relative stability over recent periods contrasts
with the more volatile output gap observed earlier.
Chart 4
Real GDP and Potential Output
































Chart 6 shows the growth rate of the Bank’s measure
of potential output, as well as the growth rate of trend
labour inputs. The difference between the two lines
represents growth in trend labour productivity.
Growth in potential output has remained between
3 and 4 per cent since 1996, and is currently running
around 3 per cent.
The outlook for future potential output growth will be
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by demographic develop-
ments and the effects on labour productivity arising
from business investment in new machinery and
equipment. The aging of the Canadian population is
eventually expected to slow the growth of Canada’s
labour force and thus to decrease the future growth
rate of potential output.5 These changes, however, are
expected to take effect gradually; indeed, the most
signiﬁcant impact will not likely be seen until beyond
2011 (Kuszczak and Dion 1997–98).6
Productivity developments will also play an impor-
tant role in determining the growth rate of potential
output in the coming years. Canada has seen an accel-
eration in the growth rate of GDP per person-hour in
the last ﬁve years: growth in labour productivity
increased from an average of 1.4 per cent between
1970 and 1997 to an average of 1.8 per cent between
5.   Immigration policy can also have an effect on labour force growth.
6. This demographic shift continues to be consistent with Statistics Canada’s
demographic projections.
Chart 6
Potential Output and Trend Labour Input
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1997 and 2002. It is likely that productivity growth,
stimulated in particular by increased investment in
machinery and equipment and in information and
communications technology in the late 1990s, will
remain strong in the near and medium term. In the
past, however, it has been notoriously difficult to foresee
when increases in investment spending will affect
productivity growth (Crawford 2002). This difﬁculty
in turn creates some uncertainty about potential output
growth.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the average growth
of potential output in the medium term is likely to
vary around 3 per cent until the effects of population
aging on labour force participation take hold in eight
years or so, and labour input growth starts to fall by
half. Since potential and actual GDP can be expected to
move together in the coming years, this suggests that
3 per cent is a reasonable rule of thumb for average
real growth in GDP over the next ﬁve to eight years.
Implications for Income
and Other Nominal Variables
The two previous sections have implications for the
growth of nominal variables, such as income and
nominal GDP. These implications arise from two facts.
First, nominal GDP is just the product of real GDP and
the GDP deflator. Second, a number of economic varia-
bles are a more or less constant proportion of nominal
GDP.
Nominal GDP
Chart 7 shows the ﬁve-year average growth rates for
real GDP, the GDP deﬂator, and nominal GDP. In recent
years, low and stable inﬂation and real GDP growth
averaging a little above 3 per cent have led to ﬁve-year
average growth rates in nominal GDP of between
4 and 6 per cent. As inflation is expected to remain
around 2 per cent on average, projected potential
output growth of 3 per cent would translate into
average nominal GDP growth of about 5 per cent over
the next several years.
Labour income and proﬁts
If indirect taxes and the statistical discrepancy are
excluded, nominal GDP can be divided into labour
income and capital income, both broadly deﬁned.7
Capital income includes not only total profits (including
profits of government business enterprises in Canada),
7. In making this calculation, 2/3 of net farm income and net unincorporated
business income are considered to be labour income, and 1/3 is considered to
be capital income.
excluding the inventory-valuation adjustment, but
also interest and investment income and capital con-
sumption allowances.
The share of labour income shows a very mild down-
ward trend since 1961, but all of this trend can be
accounted for by a downward shift in the late 1970s
(Chart 8). Over the last 25 years or so, the labour share
has had no discernible trend, varying around 64 per
cent. Thus, the capital share has also had no discernible
trend since the late 1970s, varying around 36 per cent. At
times, the short-run movements of the shares have
Chart 7
Real GDP, Nominal GDP, and GDP Deﬂator
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been significant. In recessions, capital income—in
particular proﬁts—tends to fall proportionately more
than labour income, and thus its share can fall signiﬁ-
cantly. This was particularly evident in the early 1980s
and 1990s.8 The slowdown in economic activity in
2001 was also associated with a slight decline in the
share of capital income.
We would expect both labour income
and capital income to grow by about
5 per cent, on average, over the
medium term.
When the share of labour income in GDP is unchanged,
the rate of growth in labour income and capital income
will be the same as the rate of growth in nominal GDP.
Thus, when the shares are close to their recent norms,
we would expect average growth rates over the next
several years to be close to the projected growth in
nominal GDP. Since shares are currently close to their
25-year norms, we would expect both labour income
and capital income to grow by about 5 per cent, on
average, over the medium term.
The 5 per cent growth in labour income can be roughly
divided into 1 per cent growth in labour input (person-
hours) and 4 per cent growth in labour compensation
per person-hour. (It is important to note that some of
this increase in average labour compensation per per-
son-hour is the result of a shift in the composition of the
labour force towards more highly educated, and there-
fore more highly compensated, employees.) Since
inflation is expected to be 2 per cent per year, this
growth represents 2 per cent growth in real compen-
sation per person-hour (which is warranted by the
approximate 2 per cent increase in labour productivity).9
In contrast to the total capital share of income, the
proﬁt share has had no discernible trend, even over
the earlier years of this period, continually returning
8.   The increase in the labour share in the early 1990s was exacerbated by
hikes in payroll taxes.
9.   See Cozier (1989) for a discussion of the historical relationship between
real wages and labour productivity.
to around 12 per cent in every decade since the 1960s
(Chart 9). Again, the absence of trend in the share
implies that when the current share is close to the
norm (as currently appears to be the case), a reasonable
rule of thumb is that proﬁts would grow at the same
rate as nominal GDP, namely, 5 per cent on average
over the next several years.
The expected growth in proﬁts (also referred to as
earnings) has signiﬁcant implications for aggregate
stock market valuations. Unless the aggregate earn-
ings of companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange
(which, of course, tend to be the largest companies)
behave signiﬁcantly differently from proﬁts in the
economy as a whole, they would not grow at a rate
much different from 5 per cent per year on average
over a number of years. (While earnings of individual
companies might grow by double-digit ﬁgures for a
number of years, it would be very unlikely for this to
be true for earnings in aggregate.) Under the assump-
tions that the dividend-to-earnings ratio does not
change over time, that the discount rate is constant,
and that the growth of earnings is constant, the divi-
dend-discount approach to stock market valuation
(Hannah 2000) predicts that the rate of growth of the
stock price would equal the growth of earnings. Now,
all these assumptions are rather heroic, but they do
provide a useful benchmark against which to judge
other assumptions or projections of stock prices.
Chart 9
Ratio of Corporate Proﬁts to Nominal GDP
Annual average
Note: Corporate proﬁts and nominal GDP have been adjusted.
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Consumption
There has been considerable variation through time in
the ratios of personal disposable income to nominal
GDP, and of consumption to personal disposable
income. Many of the larger variations in these two
ratios at short-term to medium-term horizons, how-
ever, have been in opposite directions (Chart 10).10
Thus, the ratio of consumption to nominal GDP, which
is the product of these two ratios, has been much
smoother and much more stable than either of them.
In recent years, this ratio has remained more or less
constant, at around 57 or 58 per cent.11 With nominal
income expected to grow by 5 per cent on average
over the medium term, a reasonable rule of thumb is
that nominal consumption would also grow by about
5 per cent on average. Indeed, in recent years, both
have grown by about 5 per cent (Chart 11).
10.   The two major reasons for these offsetting variations are (i) the absence
of inﬂation accounting of interest income (Jump 1980 and Lau 1993), which
distorts personal disposable income, and (ii) the effect of government ﬁscal
balances—increased deﬁcits to ﬁnance personal transfers or tax cuts will
increase the ratio of personal disposable income to GDP, but the ratio of con-
sumption to personal disposable income will fall because future tax liabilities
are taken into account by households.
11. Much of the decline in the ratio of consumption to nominal GDP from the
early 1960s to the mid-1970s reﬂected a rise in the ratio of government spend-
ing on goods and services to nominal GDP. This rise was ﬁnanced in part by
increased personal taxes (note the decline in the ratio of personal disposable
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Per cent Implications for Long-Term
Bond Rates
Real long-term bond rates typically average slightly
above long-term real growth rates.12 When 30-year
Real Return Bonds were introduced in Canada, their
real yields generally remained in the 4 to 5 per cent
range until late 1996, when it became evident that the
federal government had made signiﬁcant progress in
dealingwithitsfiscalproblems(Chart12). Subsequently,
their real yields remained quite close to 4.0 per cent
for three years, before declining to around 3.5 per cent
by late 2000. (Part of this last 0.5 percentage point
decline may reflect the weakness in the world economy
that began to develop in the latter half of 2000 and has
continued to the present.) Thus, a useful rule of thumb
is that real yields would continue to vary around
3.5 or 4.0 per cent in coming years.
The difference between 30-year nominal and Real
Return Bond yields declined to about 2 per cent by
12. This has tended to be the case in Canada over the last 20 years. Economic
theory would suggest that the real rate of return on capital would exceed the
real growth rate of the economy. As long as the risk premium on private
capital relative to government bonds is not too large, we would also expect
that the real yield on government bonds would be slightly higher than the
real growth of the economy. All this is strictly true only in a closed economy.
In a small open economy, this real interest rate would reﬂect the world real
interest rate, which in turn would reﬂect the real growth rate of the world
economy.
Chart 11
Nominal Consumption and Nominal GDP
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late 1997, reﬂecting the growing credibility of the 2 per
cent inﬂation target, as well as increased credibility in
ﬁscal policy. As a result, 30-year nominal bonds have
tended to vary in a relatively narrow range around
5.5 per cent in recent years. With credibility in monetary
and ﬁscal policy continuing, a useful rule of thumb is
that 30-year nominal bonds will continue to vary in a
range around 5.5 or 6.0 per cent.
With credibility in monetary and
ﬁscal policy continuing, a useful rule
of thumb is that 30-year nominal
bonds will continue to vary in a
range around 5.5 or 6.0 per cent.
Five-year and 10-year bond yields tend to be more
variable than 30-year yields because the weight of
Chart 12
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expected short-term interest rates over the ﬁrst couple
of years is greater for them than for 30-year yields. But
they too have been much more stable in the last ﬁve or
six years than in the previous 20 or 25 years (Chart 13).
It is reasonable to think that a policy of low, stable,
and predictable inﬂation will mean that this increased
stability of yields will continue.
Conclusions
Although economic uncertainty is a fact of life, the
Bank of Canada’s framework of inﬂation control has
led to a signiﬁcant decline in the uncertainty regard-
ing inﬂation and other nominal variables. This frame-
work has also been useful in dampening the volatility
in real GDP. Combined with a smooth projected path
for potential output over the next several years, this
allows for some simple rules of thumb for households,
businesses, and governments to use in their medium-
term planning. There are, of course, no guarantees as
to the accuracy of these rules as forecasts, but they
should prove useful when applied to averages over




























Per cent23 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2003
Literature Cited
Bank of Canada. 1991. “Targets for Reducing Inﬂation:
Announcements and Background Material.” Bank
of Canada Review (March): 3–21.
Cozier, B. 1989. “Real Wages in Canada: An Analysis
of Recent Trends.” Bank of Canada Review
(November) 3–17.
Crawford,A.2001.“PredictabilityofAverageInﬂation
over Long Time Horizons.” Bank of Canada Review
(Autumn): 13–20.
———. 2002. “Trends in Productivity Growth in Can-
ada.” Bank of Canada Review (Summer): 19–32.
Debs, A. 2001. “Testing for a Structural Break in
the Volatility of Real GDP Growth in Canada.”
Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2001–9.
Hannah, B. 2000. “Approaches to Current Stock
Market Valuations.” Bank of Canada Review
(Summer): 27–36.
Jump, G. 1980. Inﬂation-Related Spurious Elements
in Measured Savings of Various Sectors of the
Economy in the Canadian Experience, 1962–77.
Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada.
Kuszczak, J. and R. Dion. 1997–98. “Potential Output
Growth: Some Long-Term Projections.” Bank of
Canada Review (Winter): 43–59.
Lau, H. 1993. “Behaviour of the Personal Savings Rate
in Canada in Recent Years: A Note.” Bank of
Canada Review (Spring): 57–67.
Longworth, D. 2002. “Inflation and the Macroeconomy:
Changes from the 1980s to the 1990s.” Bank of
Canada Review (Spring): 3–18.